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Françoise Lavocat: Fait et Fiction. Pour une frontière. Paris: Seuil 2016. 618 pp. 
EUR 33.00. ISBN 978-2-0212-4271-3 
Have the boundaries between fact and fiction become obsolete in (post-)post-
modern societies, as is often claimed? In Fait et Fiction. Pour une frontière (Seuil, 
2016) Françoise Lavocat, professor of Comparative Literature at the Université 
Paris 3-Sorbonne nouvelle, pulls apart such hasty generalisations. She admits 
that the blurring of the boundaries between fact and fiction is increasingly wide-
spread, in the arts but also in the non-fiction genres par excellence, journalism 
and documentary; cyberculture allows people’s fictional avatars to become more 
real than their realtime personalities, while ‘postmodern’ thinking has given its 
blessing to the dismissal of factuality, finding fiction everywhere, even in our 
rapport with reality, ourselves, or history. But, she argues, our pleasure or anger 
at boundary blurring practices already shows that frontiers between the two 
realms are very much alive. Moreover, how cogent are the arguments of panfic-
tionalists really? Adopting a “moderate differentialism”, the author sets out to 
demonstrate “the existence and the cognitive, conceptual and political necessity 
of the frontiers of fiction” (p. 12).1 
While her own understanding of fiction converges to some extent with phil-
osophical and pragmatic definition of fiction as make-believe (Kendall Walton 
1990) or as shared ludic pretense (Jean-Marie Schaeffer 1999), Lavocat defends 
the need for an ontological definition, as issues of modes of existence cannot 
but play a central role in any distinction of fiction. Fiction, she proposes, is a 
“cultural artefact produced through an act of imagination, and which is not sub-
mitted to the conditions of vericonditionality determined by reference to the 
empirical world” (p. 33). This definition should be sufficiently broad yet suffi-
ciently precise to allow the analysis of and reflection on the variegated relations 
between fact and fiction across times, places and cultures, which her book aims 
to do, focusing on questions such as: what arguments are invoked to declare the 
frontiers between fact and fiction obsolete? What is meant by fiction in such 
debates? How can fiction and its hybridisations with factuality be most produc-
tively theorised? What would be the conditions for what she calls a ‘culture of 
fiction’? This ambitious task is approached through a correspondingly broad his-
torical, crosscultural and multimedial framework, which draws on analytic phi-
losophy, anthropology, narrative theory, law, linguistics, pragmatics, psychoanal-
ysis and cognitive sciences. The analyses are richly supported by examples 
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ranging from French and, more broadly, Western, literary fiction, to excursions 
into Antiquity, ancient and contemporary Japan and China, and to film, contem-
porary popular art and virtual reality practices. 
The book is comprised of three parts. The first part, “Monisms and dual-
isms”, opens with a brief overview of the history and theories of fiction, fol-
lowed by the analysis of three fairly recent debates – within narrative theory, 
historiography, and psychoanalysis and avant-garde culture in France respec-
tively – in which the distinction of fiction was contested. In a pattern that recurs 
throughout the book, these analyses are shot through with historical and cross-
cultural excursions, which often offer a counterpoint or corrective to the fore-
grounded theories of fiction. Lavocat characterises the history of fiction as the 
constant oscillation and varying “cohabitation” between negatively and posi-
tively connoted conceptions of fiction that have been with us since Ancient 
Greece, which she traces in a number of historical and contemporary theories 
of fiction: fiction as deceit (pseudo) versus fiction as creative invention, as simu-
lation that does not seek to deceive (plasma; the Greek terms are borrowed from 
the classicist Barbara Cassin; cf. p. 20). 
Lavocat then reconstructs the “genealogy” that leads from narratological the-
ories of fiction developed from the sixties onward, which she labels as predom-
inantly “differentialist” or “dualist,” to the currently more popular “monist”, 
even panfictionalist, theories of storytelling. Early narratologists, she argues, 
tended to privilege literary fictional texts. They also implicitly assumed the dis-
tinction of literary fiction from nonliterary and nonfictional texts, with the ex-
ception of Käte Hamburger, with her pioneering Die Logik der Dichtung (1957), 
and more recently, Dorrit Cohn, with The Distinction of Fiction (1999). Both works 
studied formal markers of fictionality, such as the use of past tense, third person 
perspective, or temporal and other deictic shifts (cf. p. 34f.). In the seventies, 
this “differentialist” research was supplanted under the sway of pragmatics. 
Searle’s rejection of text-internal criteria for distinguishing fictionality, in favour 
of text-external signals, in particular had a strong impact also on literary scholars. 
Theories of storytelling originating from pragmatics became increasingly popular 
as of the eighties also within literary studies. While they mainly focused on fac-
tual narratives, it was mostly assumed that there was continuity between literary 
and everyday narratives, which explains Lavocat’s characterisation of storytelling 
theories as panfictionalist or “monist”: all stories are basically fictional, in the 
sense that they are crafted and express subjective viewpoints (not a sin, in post-
modern times). In fact, she notes, both narratological and storytelling ap-
proaches tend to unduly generalise one particular understanding of fiction on 
the basis of their privileged corpus, and to elude the question whether fiction in 
a stricter sense has any formal specificity and relevance – a bias that seriously 
compromises their theoretical and analytic potential. 
Having thus set the stage, Lavocat examines the erosion of the distinction of 
fact and fiction in historiography and psychoanalysis: the realms of our shared 
past, and that of our selves. She exposes (sometimes quite scathingly, cf. for 
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instance her comments on Barthes, p. 59) the normative assumptions in schol-
ars’ argumentations and the dead ends to which they lead, concentrating on Ro-
land Barthes, Hayden White, Paul Ricœur, Paul Veyne, taken to represent post-
modern thinking and its critique of ‘truth’ and ‘facts’. In their different ways, 
these scholars exposed history as a fictional, subjective and value-laden narra-
tivisation, if only by its emplotment and the literary devices deployed to mimetic 
effect. Reality – and history – soon took revenge: Lavocat shows how their prin-
cipled skepticism as to the possibility of knowing the past and its ‘facts’ made it 
impossible for these historians to confront historical revisionism without logical 
contradiction. In fact, as she wryly notes, these same sceptics hastened to rule 
that historians should commit themselves to ethical imperatives of memory, 
which sit uneasily with their ‘panfictionalist’ claims. In her analysis, Veyne went 
furthest in his lucid self-critique, explicitly distancing himself from his own rela-
tivist positions, and more generally, from a ‘linguistic turn’ that fostered existen-
tial duplicity as it allowed epistemological skepticism to cohabit with all but skep-
tical ethical existential and political position takings (pp. 94-96). Lavocat’s 
emphasis on Veyne, who is probably less known outside France than the other 
three scholars she singles out, sounds a note that is perceptible throughout her 
book: that of a commitment to intellectual honesty and rigour, in contrast to 
forms of scholarship that swim with the tide. One might feel, however, that in 
her focus on argumentative rigour Lavocat loses sight of the contextual timeli-
ness of these strongly voiced critiques in a period in which historiography was 
dominated by a positivist doxa. Ricœur’s main interest in rethinking historiog-
raphy, for instance, was perhaps less the logical and epistemological status of 
historical referentiality, but rather, as befits a hermeneutic approach, meaning 
making and its ethical and existential motivations. Lavocat discusses Ricœur’s 
ethical interest in the last section of her chapter, but mainly as a logical incon-
sistency revealing the deficiencies of the panfictionalism she attributes to him. 
While White or Ricœur still endowed history-as-fiction with the power to 
construct meaning, Lacanian psychoanalysis, hugely popular among the French 
intellectual and artistic avant-garde in the sixties and seventies, turned the im-
possibility to reach “the real” into a fundamental lack at the heart of our selves, 
a lack that became the source of a haunting desire (cf. chapter III). Jacques La-
can’s famous phrase: “The real, that is the impossible” (Le réel, c’est l’impossible, 
quoted p. 120) captures the idea that language, our biased perceptions and fab-
ulating psyche weave webs of fictions in which we live and which constitute us, 
forever separating us from reality. In contrast to the playfulness of some of 
Barthes’ or White’s writings, this anguished panfictionalism once again nega-
tively connotes fiction as deceit, setting for psychoanalysis – but also for writers 
and artists – the ethical if not political task to unmask fiction at the heart of what 
is perceived as reality. Lavocat shows how Tel Quel, the avant-garde movement 
lead by Philippe Sollers and Julia Kristeva, seized upon amongst others Lacan’s 
ideas, denouncing any form of literature that aimed at a ‘realist’ evocation of 
reality. The good old Balzacian novel, with its mimetic characters, descriptions 
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and plots, became the epitome of fiction’s deceptive realism and immersive ap-
peal. But fiction – in the restricted sense of literary/artistic fiction – also held 
the cure: by thematising fiction as a lie, the experimental ‘new novel’ would make 
its readers experience the real as precisely that which is unattainable (Romantic 
irony is in the air). But in this metafictional salvation move, the issue of fiction-
ality itself – why do we cultivate such fictional or metafictional artefacts? –was 
again evacuated. 
The book’s first part, with its critique of ‘panfictionalist’ positions, ends with 
a chapter on developmental psychology, cognitive sciences and AI research, 
from which empirically grounded insights about the distinction between fact and 
fiction might be expected. Alas, Lavocat shows, not only are the empirical ex-
periments that test claims about uses of fiction often too limited to be conclu-
sive, the little evidence they offer works sometimes in support of monist (‘all is 
fiction’) and sometimes of dualist positions (‘fact and fiction can and should be 
distinguished’). Thus, some experiments suggest that the neuronal processes in-
volved in the reading of factual or fictional texts appear to be the same, and 
research on emotion and the modelling of beliefs tends to tone down the frontier 
between fact and fiction, or to conceive of them as set on a continuum. Yet 
other studies in developmental psychology and cognitive sciences suggest that 
the capacity to discriminate between real and imagined is an important threshold 
in child development, and that our engagement in fictional works produces a 
cognitive shift that limits our tendency to action and our ‘self memory’, making 
us rely on a semantic memory instead. The latter findings, however inconclusive 
yet, unsurprisingly found their way into Lavocat’s own ontological definition of 
fiction, as we will see in the discussion of Part III. 
In the second part of the book, “Cultures and Beliefs”, Lavocat explores the 
anthropological limits and the societal, institutional and media-technological 
conditions of what she labels “cultures of fictionality”. A core question at the 
opening of this second part is indeed whether all cultures have fiction. If one 
understands fiction in the broad sense of storytelling, this is probably the case. 
If, however, one understands fiction more narrowly as the production of – and 
pleasure in – representations of state of affairs that one knows not to exist, then 
the idea that fiction is an invention of (Western) modernity seems more plausi-
ble, Lavocat suggests, before correcting that idea by an elaborate discussion of 
The Tale of Genji, a Japanese literary classic from around the year 1000. This work, 
with its – to a contemporary Western reader – somewhat labyrinthine court in-
trigues and settings, has one chapter that ever so clearly and playfully stages a 
reflection on the uses and powers of fiction, which seems to pass under review 
most theories of fiction articulated from Plato to now. While one early occur-
rence of metafictional reflection does not allow to conclude that fiction is of all 
times and places, it does suggest hypotheses about the economic, political and 
religious conditions under which a “culture of fiction” can flourish, which 
Lavocat summarises as: leisure and sophistication, a societal system that values 
and protects imagination and reflection on the nature of reality, and a smooth 
circulation between the sacred and the profane (pp. 200f.). In contrast, Lavocat 
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discusses the case of the Amerindian Kuna tribe studied by the anthropologist 
Carlo Severi, a culture without fiction – which, according to Lavocat, conse-
quently cannot but be a culture without factuality. While they may not (or not 
yet) be scientifically conclusive, such suggestive anthropological reflections make 
us reconsider more narrow and culture bound notions and practices of fiction. 
One critical note, in passing: this chapter shows a risk occasionally incurred by 
Lavocat’s broad explorations. Between the captivating discussions of The Tale of 
Genji and the Kuna’s mythologising attitude to real events, readers are taken to 
revisit in two or three pages the poiesis/mimesis couple set in place in Ancient 
Greece, revised through the anthropological, historical and philosophical lenses 
of contemporary scholars such as Claude Calame, Jean-Marie Schaeffer and 
Jacques Rancière. Sometimes ‘less is more’. 
Intersections of beliefs held in imaginary worlds and in the real world are 
examined in the following chapters, which zoom in on the limits set to fiction 
by institutionalised religion and law. Lavocat reminds us that with respect to 
beliefs, reality cannot be constructed as the opposite to fiction, as has also been 
argued by analytic philosophers, such as Henry Price and Hilary Putnam: what 
we take to be the case and true often relies on unchecked evidence, and speakers 
compensate their limited knowledge by relying on knowledge accumulated in 
their community (cf. p. 221). Precisely the engagement with fiction (in Lavocat’s 
restricted sense) can make one realise the fragility of beliefs on which one’s con-
duct and judgment rest, constituting an exercise in freedom – a motive that runs 
through various chapters. The author also reminds us that fiction requires dis-
belief (awareness of the fact that one engages in an ontologically separate world) 
as much as belief (immersion in fictional worlds, engagement with characters). 
Any theory downplaying this oscillation cannot but be reductive, as would be 
the case with Coleridge’s ‘willing suspension of disbelief’. These insights are not 
in themselves new, but Lavocat examines such tensions through fresh concep-
tual, historically and crossculturally comparative perspectives, illustrating them 
with examples ranging from debates occasioned by religious counterfactual fic-
tion and works perceived as blasphemy in 17th century France, to contemporary 
popular culture, such as The Matrix, Jerry Springer’s The Opera and Rushdie’s 
Satanic Verses. 
The exposure of the doxa in fiction raises the question of the juridical context 
in which fiction operates. In particularly interesting sections, Lavocat discusses 
cases in which fiction comes too close to reality, by portraying existing people 
or situations, for instance, and analyses virtual reality (VR) as a lawless space. VR 
worlds not only raise new problems regarding authorship and copyright. They 
also elicit perplexity as to their status: in the legislation concerning VR, Lavocat 
also shows how VR practices and representations are sometimes treated as real-
ity, sometimes as fiction/art, benefiting from the right to (moral) transgression 
conventionally granted to art in modernity while offering very real platforms for 
sexual abuse, paedophilia and violence on avatars, with often very real effects on 
real people. The production and distribution of VR have also become fiscal par-
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adises and privileged means for whitewashing suspect fortunes, while fictive cur-
rencies used in many a game make a lot of real money change pockets. The often 
hesitant and variegated legislation on such thorny issues makes the call for a new 
conceptual framework even more relevant. 
As a contribution to such a conceptual framework, Lavocat then seeks to 
specify criteria for discriminating between virtuality, fictionality and reality in the 
digital age. This exploration takes the author deep into cyberculture. Most inter-
esting to Lavocat’s argument are the digital entertainment and/or art practices 
that make players imagine worlds, and which hence might qualify as fiction in 
Lavocat’s sense, such as virtual social worlds or the Metaverse, massive multi-
player online games (MMOGs), IRL (in real life), or videogames. Do these var-
iously hybrid practices deal the final blow to the traditional fiction/fact distinc-
tion and, uncannily, to the ‘realness’ of real experience? Lavocat dedramatizes 
such questions, setting out to disentangle the factual and fictional strands in 
these practices and in people’s engagement with them, with particularly rich 
pages on the reference to existing places in VR games (cf. pp. 318-323). While 
she acknowledges how very real the sensory appeal of such games may be, and 
how an avatar, for instance, can absorb our actual daily life, Lavocat is not pre-
pared to relinquish the distinction of fiction. Even the increasing trend in vide-
ogames to create full-fledged worlds, with a plot, characters one can empathise 
with, and moral dimensions, only proves the persisting attraction of fiction, she 
maintains (p. 344). In these games the interest and effort in worldmaking or em-
pathising are usually less intense than the involvement in the action required 
from the player (cf. p. 339). The differences between (traditional) fiction and 
games remain fundamental, she concludes. They are alethic (the distribution of 
what is or can be the case is not the same: in a virtual world, one can change a 
state of affairs, in fiction – except if it is of an experimental kind – one cannot), 
deontic (the rules of the game are imposed, the world of fiction is proposed), 
axiological (games are usually indifferent to moral norms, or at least these do not 
form a core part of the experience, as they do in fiction), epistemic (to engage 
with fiction requires other types of knowledge and skills than games), and prag-
matic (fiction refers to a world on the ‘as if’ mode, games require action upon 
the proposed virtual world; cf. pp. 343f.). 
Part II’s reflection on fiction as a highly sensitive and versatile platform on 
which imagination encounters and confronts reality appropriately concludes 
with a reflection on character, a privileged hinge between real and fictional 
worlds as they elicit real emotions as well as responses of identification, empathy 
or dislike. Arguing that empirical psychology and cognitive sciences cannot be 
ignored if one wishes to understand the engagement with fictional or factual 
practices, Lavocat draws on research on empathy and identification (in particular 
on Suzanne Keen’s work) to conclude, once again, that the specificity of emo-
tional and moral responses to fiction is beyond doubt (cf. pp. 354-358). It resides 
in the relaxation of evaluation, suspension of self-centredness, and inhibition of 
action (cf. p. 363). This emphasis on the ontological distinction of fiction from 
ludic virtual reality practices is consistent with Lavocat’s understanding of fiction 
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as a cognitive and pragmatic shift, which allows engagement but inhibits action, 
discussed at the end of Part I. 
The title of the third part, “D’un monde l’autre” (literally: From one world, 
the other) is not easy to translate. Its unconventional elliptic syntax suggests the 
instability of the rapports between one world and another. Thus, the title high-
lights a core theme of Lavocat’s book: not just the notion of worlds, central in 
Lavocat’s ontological approach, but also the constitutive ontological hybridity 
of fiction. In this last part Lavocat further defends and develops her own onto-
logical perspective, building mainly on possible worlds theory (PWT), which she 
helped finetune and spread among the Francophone public (cf. for instance 
Lavocat 2010). Ontology may not be fashionable nowadays, as pragmatic meth-
ods and cultural critique hold sway; it may be associated with essentialist (‘meta-
physical‘), anticonstructivist and antirelativist positions considered outdated; 
still, Lavocat argues, one cannot conceptualise ‘fiction’ – and a fortiori its hy-
bridisations with factuality – without using ontological concepts, such as 
worldmaking and modes of existence or of reference. Anxieties about the ‘real-
ness of reality’ and the status of the human, in response to the explosion of 
virtual reality, moreover make precise ontological analyses existentially relevant. 
Taking her distance from philosophical simulation theories of fiction and from 
a pragmatic approach which foreground or assume the ontological autonomy of 
fictional worlds (Lavocat mainly refers to Walton, Searle, Currie, and Schaeffer), 
Lavocat finds in PWT a theoretical and analytic framework that allows to con-
ceptualise the hybrid status of fiction and to analyse degrees of fictionality. This 
means, however, getting rid of a number of unhelpful linguistic and logical con-
straints initially stipulated by PWT, such as its focus on propositions and its re-
quirements of completion and noncontradiction: not only can fictions evoke 
worlds through other than linguistic means; these worlds are incomplete, onto-
logically heterogeneous, and paradoxical by constitution, not by error or failure. 
Drawing on the work of among others Thomas Pavel, Lubomír Doležel, Marie-
Laure Ryan and Brian McHale, Lavocat shows that fictional worlds are indeed 
composed of different modalities, some of these real, others fictional or virtual 
(pp. 396f.); they also combine heterogeneous modes of reference (extrafictional, 
interfictional and intrafictional). 
In a following chapter, Lavocat addresses the role of ontological paradoxes 
in fiction. Not only do fictions provoke real emotions – a central and famous 
‘paradox of fiction’ –, they often exploit (onto)logical “impossibilities”, such as 
being told by impossible narrators (a dead person, an animal, a thing), narrating 
information that cannot possibly be known (people’s thoughts) or experiences 
that are physically unfeasible, such as time travelling (Lavocat draws on the work 
of amongst others Olivier Caïra 2011, but research under the flag of Unnatural 
Narratology also comes to mind; cf. for instance Jan Alber 2018). The greatest 
paradox, meanwhile, may be that those who engage in such fictions are often 
hardly unsettled by such paradoxes; rather, Lavocat proposes, these are im-
portant triggers for interpretive activity; and of course, habituation may occur. 
Ontological instability and paradoxes may precisely be the source of the pleasure 
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people take in fiction, the author suggests: we are challenged to actively cooper-
ate and to ‘repair’, as it were, an imagined world’s impossibilities and contradic-
tions through our interpretive strategies (cf. p. 533; Lavocat’s analysis recalls 
Tamar Yacobi’s fine analysis of the coping strategies readers develop in response 
to unreliable narration; cf. for instance Yacobi 1981). 
The heterogeneity and paradoxes of fiction culminate in the device of 
metalepsis, which Lavocat makes the object of the concluding chapter. In its 
original coinage by Genette in Figures III, metalepsis was defined as the “passage 
from one narrative level to another” (Genette 1972, 244f., cited in Lavocat, 
p. 474). The games which such passages play “manifest through the intensity of 
their effects the importance of the limit that they endeavour to transgress re-
gardless of verisimilitude […]; the mobile but sacred frontier between two 
worlds: the one in which one narrates, the one that one narrates.” (Genette, ibid., 
cited by Lavocat, p. 475) 
However, as Lavocat shows, referring amongst others to the volume on 
metalepsis edited by John Pier and Jean-Marie Schaeffer (2005), this firm sense 
of a frontier is undermined or abandoned in later theories, in particular with the 
displacement of scholarly interest from the (intrafictional) levels of discourse, or 
rhetorical metalepsis (Ryan 2005, 207), to relations between worlds or ontologi-
cal metalepsis (ibid.) which would blur the frontier between fact and fiction by 
realising their “interpenetration” and “contamination” (ibid., discussed in 
Lavocat, p. 479). The popularity of such ontological or “literal” metalepses is 
indeed demonstrated not just in literature, theatre and film, with classics such as 
John Fowles’ The French Lieutenant’s Woman (1969), Pirandello’s Six Characters in 
Search of an Author (1921) or The Purple Rose of Cairo (1985), but also in graphic 
novels or videogames – works in which characters meet their creators, readers 
are drawn into the fictional world, or other uncanny or jubilatory border cross-
ings. But the popularity of such transgression of frontiers does not justify theo-
retical claims about a fusion of worlds: metalepsis precisely confirms the frontier 
it plays with. “The favor enjoyed by the hypothesis of a fusion of worlds oper-
ated by metalepsis can only be explained by an influence of fiction [itself] on 
theory or by the adoption of postulates that implicitly pertain not so much to 
fiction, but to reality itself”, Lavocat finely observes (p. 480). Thus, this last 
chapter elegantly brings to conclusion Lavocat’s argument in favour of the dis-
tinction of fiction. 
Lavocat’s book is a significant contribution to the currently flourishing dis-
cussion on the rapport between fact and fiction. It should work as an effective 
antidote to overgeneralising theoretical or culture analytic claims and theoretical 
provincialisms. Its broad historical and analytic scope brings home the variety, 
complexity and fragility of the articulations between real and imagined worlds, 
not just in Western contemporary society, but across time, places, and media. 
Lavocat’s emphasis on fiction as a fundamentally hybrid, multimodal practice 
opens up important avenues for research. If we want to handle, for real, the 
complexities of our world, including the dizzying possibilities opened up by cy-
berculture, we need to develop both clear and subtle criteria to distinguish fact 
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and fiction, in full acknowledgment of their actual hybridisations. Clearly, such 
an ambitiously broad and multidisciplinary undertaking cannot but raise ques-
tions and critiques. For instance, in light of Lavocat’s insistence on conceptual 
matters, the often unreflected extension of her core notions of ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ 
to other terms, such as ‘the real’, ‘reality’, ‘factuality’, and, on the other side, 
‘(works of) imagination’, ‘imaginary’, or ‘belief’ is surprising, as is the lack of 
explicit reflection on the association of fiction with art. The author might also 
have made more explicit the ways in which the adopted ontological perspective 
relates to a pragmatic approach. In particular, the importance of communication 
contracts and the role of interpretation as well as of underlying framing acts 
would have deserved more detailed discussion. These dimensions seem deeply 
compatible with Lavocat’s interest in historical and crosscultural contextualisa-
tion and in cognitive sciences; they might also have both challenged and enriched 
the adopted ontological perspective. But this is definitely a work that should be 
translated into English (and, why not, into Japanese and Chinese), with the ad-
ditional benefit that it would help spread relevant Francophone work on fiction 
and narrative. A translation could be an occasion to reconsider the book’s form: 
dividing the original’s material into two or even three volumes might make it 
more accessible to readers. With all the pages it devotes to fiction, this book is 
very much also a defence of ‘reality’: a commitment to a rigorous shared assess-
ment of ‘what is’, and to reason, logic, science as indispensable tools. Fiction, 
the arts, games, as practices that keep us flexible and alert, is the more passion-
ately defended as it works in tandem with that commitment to knowing ‘the 
real’. 
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